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REPORT OF THE SECRETARY-GENERAL ON THE UNITED NATIONS MISSION IN HAITI

I. INTRODUCTION

1. By its resolution 1007 (1995) of 31 July 1995, the Security Council decided to extend the mandate of the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) for a period of seven months until 29 February 1996, and requested me to report to it on progress in the fulfilment of its mandate at its mid-point. In compliance with that resolution, I submitted a report to the Security Council on 6 November 1995 (S/1995/922). Subsequently, on 16 November 1995, the Security Council, through its President, requested that, in consultation with the Friends of the Secretary-General for Haiti and the Haitian authorities, I submit to the Council, at the appropriate time, a report on the "next steps in the areas of security, law enforcement and humanitarian assistance, ... which the international community may take to help Haiti to achieve a long-term future that is secure, stable and free" (see S/PRST/1995/55). The present report is submitted in pursuance of that request, following my observations to the Security Council on 22 January 1996 and the briefing of the Council by my Special Representative on 30 January 1996. It covers significant developments in Haiti since my report of 6 November 1995 and includes an assessment of achievements there by the United Nations, together with my recommendations on the role that the United Nations should continue to play in Haiti to consolidate the gains achieved so far. It takes into account a letter, dated 9 February 1996, in which the newly elected President of Haiti has asked me to "take appropriate steps with a view to bringing about an extension of the mandate of UNMIH so that a gradual withdrawal may take place in the months ahead". President Préval's letter has been circulated under the symbol S/1996/99.

II. ELECTIONS

2. Political activity during the period covered by the present report centred around the presidential election. A campaign was launched to have President Aristide remain in office for three more years to make up for the time he had spent in exile. This campaign, which caused some confusion, including within the Lavalas Movement, lost momentum after President Aristide made it

clear that he would hand over power, as provided for in the Constitution, on 7 February 1996.

3. The timely holding of the presidential election was a significant step in the consolidation of constitutional order in Haiti. Learning from the experience it had gained from the flaws in the organization of legislative and local elections, the Provisional Electoral Council made elaborate preparations. Fourteen candidates participated in the election. Of the main parties that had boycotted the second round of the legislative elections, only one took part in the contest despite its initial doubts over the impartiality of the electoral apparatus. The Provisional Electoral Council maintained a regular dialogue both with the candidates, in order to address their concerns, and with the media, in order to ensure a continuous flow of election-related information. As a result, the Provisional Electoral Council was widely credited with having improved the openness and transparency in the electoral process. In accordance with its mandate, UNMIH provided extensive technical assistance to the Provisional Electoral Council in preparing for the election, as well as the necessary logistical support. Material required for registration and polling was distributed and collected throughout the country with the help of UNMIH. Haitian National Police and UNMIH forces prepared a detailed national election security plan to ensure security for the entire electoral process, including security for the candidates and their public meetings.

4. Polling took place in a peaceful environment. There were no major incidents of violence during the run-up to the election, on polling day, or during the counting over the following days. While there were minor problems, the Provisional Electoral Council worked with dispatch to solve them. Over 400 international observers, including the Election Observation Mission (EOM) of the Organization of American States (OAS), a presidential delegation from the United States, a French parliamentary delegation and several non-governmental organizations (NGOs), all considered the election to have been free, fair and peaceful. Some disappointment was expressed at the low voter turnout (about 28 per cent), for which various reasons were cited: disenchantment over the lack of tangible economic progress; the desire of a segment of the population that President Aristide should continue in office for another three years; election fatigue; and a general feeling that the victory of the Lavalas candidate was a foregone conclusion.

5. The results of the election were announced on 23 December 1995 by the President of the Provisional Electoral Council. Mr. René Préval, President Aristide's Prime Minister in 1991 and the candidate of the ruling Lavalas Movement, won in the first round with 87.9 per cent of the votes. His assumption of power on 7 February 1996, when one democratically elected President succeeded another, was an important milestone in Haitian history.

III. SECURITY SITUATION

6. As previously reported (see S/1995/922, para. 12) the security situation in Haiti had improved markedly in September and October 1995 as a result of the more active role played by the Haitian public security forces and of the continued efforts of UNMIH. Throughout the country, the fear that had been

widespread earlier in the year had all but disappeared, and people felt more confident that the Haitian National Police and the Interim Public Security Force, with UNMIH support, were providing adequate protection to the public and could cope with any situation. Although the number of popular demonstrations over economic and social issues, such as the lack of schools, roads, electricity or employment, continued to increase, they were generally peaceful and did not generate any lasting or widespread tensions.

7. However, the security situation deteriorated abruptly in the wake of the attack on 7 November 1995 against two deputies, one of whom - M. Jean Hubert Feuillé - was killed and the other seriously injured. Violent demonstrations erupted in Les Cayes, Département du Sud, to which the two deputies belonged, necessitating the deployment of the Quick Reaction Force and joint Haitian National Police/UNMIH patrols for several days until the situation stabilized. On 11 November, President Aristide, in highly emotional remarks at the funeral service for deputy Feuillé, called for immediate and total disarmament and accused the international community of complacency in this regard. Agitation quickly spread to other cities. Roadblocks were set up, and demonstrations, acts of arson, looting, weapons searches and vigilante justice occurred in various places throughout Haiti, especially Port-au-Prince, Gonaïves and Cap Haïtien. Confusion and fear reappeared and there were reports that members of the bourgeoisie and former members of the armed forces were hurriedly leaving the country. Following a meeting with President Aristide, my Special Representative appealed to the people on 13 November not to take the law into their own hands and the police, with the support of UNMIH, slowly re-established control. These incidents, which left at least seven people dead, many more injured and considerable property damage, brought home the fact that the security situation was still fragile.

8. UNMIH has enjoyed the support and respect of the overwhelming majority of the Haitian people. My Special Representative and his senior civilian and police colleagues, as well as the UNMIH military commanders and their officers, have kept in close touch with Haiti's ministers, civil servants and community leaders. However, from the beginning, small groups on both the left and the right of the political spectrum have expressed opposition to what they refer to as the "invasion" carried out by the United States of America in September 1994 and the perceived "occupation" of the country by both the United States and the United Nations. During the above-mentioned days of renewed tension in mid-November, anti-United Nations slogans appeared on the streets of Port-au-Prince and on some leaflets. Earlier in August, an UNMIH Civilian Police (CIVPOL) officer had been shot in his house in Petit Goâve and critically wounded. On 17 December, also in Petit Goâve, shots were fired at an UNMIH military vehicle. The vehicle was hit but, fortunately, nobody was injured. On 29 January 1996, a CIVPOL officer was killed in Port-au-Prince in an apparent robbery attempt. Notwithstanding these incidents, which are still being investigated, there is no indication of any organized threat against UNMIH personnel.

9. Common crime, however, remains a very serious problem throughout the country, and a major concern for the population, especially the poorer section. Incidents involving theft of property from UNMIH's installations and personnel have become more frequent lately.

IV. HAITIAN NATIONAL POLICE

10. In my last report (see S/1995/922, para. 17), I mentioned that the Government of Haiti had decided on a national police force of 5,000 officers, to be trained and deployed before the end of the mandate of UNMIH on 29 February 1996. At present, over 3,600 Haitian National Police personnel have been deployed. Over 750 new policemen graduated on 20 January and are currently being deployed. By mid-February, the last class - the ninth - will complete its training.

11. Following the gradual demobilization of most members of the Interim Public Security Force, which had originated in the disbanded Haitian Armed Forces, the Interim Force was abolished by presidential decree on 6 December 1995. By the end of February 1996, the security forces should comprise about 6,500 personnel and include the National Palace and Residence Guards, the Ministerial Guard Unit, some 900 Interim Public Security Force personnel trained in United States facilities in Guantánamo, Cuba, some 130 former officers from the disbanded Armed Forces of Haiti (FAd'H) and a few Interim Force technicians.

12. It will be recalled that, under Security Council resolution 940 (1994) of 31 July 1994, UNMIH was mandated to assist the Government of Haiti in the creation of a police force. Pursuant to Council resolution 975 (1995) of 30 January 1995, a total of 847 United Nations CIVPOL officers from 19 countries were deployed in 19 locations. While formal training of the new police force is being carried out with the assistance of Canada, France and the United States in the Police Academy, run by the International Criminal Investigative Training Assistance Programme (ICITAP) of the United States, UNMIH has worked closely with the Haitian authorities to provide on-the-job training and to give guidance to the new police officers now deployed throughout the country and monitor their performance. In addition, three CIVPOL officers are assigned to a 10-man Criminal Investigation Unit to investigate particularly sensitive murder cases. Two Haitian National Police officers are attached to CIVPOL headquarters and are undergoing on-the-job training in administrative procedures, computer use and statistical work. To enhance its training capacity and ensure closer cooperation, CIVPOL has moved into Haitian National Police stations at a number of locations such as Port-au-Prince, Arcahaie and Croix des Bouquets. UNMIH has instituted a programme to train 200 Haitian National Police drivers in an attempt to reduce the critically high accident rate and prevent further loss of vehicles recently acquired for the police.

13. The Haitian police officers have a visible presence on the roads and in various communities. They engage in foot and mobile patrols, receive complaints from the public and investigate criminal cases. They are generally well motivated and willing to work and performed creditably in providing security during the presidential election. They are young and inexperienced, however, and lack proper infrastructure and equipment. They need further training in management, crime investigation and the planning of security events and most would benefit from additional firearms and driver training.

14. The most serious concern is the absence of competent senior officers and overall leadership. The impact of inadequate experience and leadership can be seen from a number of instances when Haitian National Police personnel have used

unwarranted or disproportionate force, often resulting in incidents that could have been avoided. A case in point was the unnecessary use of a firearm by a Haitian National Police officer in the slum of Cité Soleil, which caused the accidental killing of a child on 23 November 1995 and resulted in riots and the burning of the police station by the enraged populace. The Haitian National Police did not re-enter the area for two weeks and the only security during that period was that provided by UNMIH patrols. Lack of leadership has also affected the discipline of the force, leading to incorrect behaviour, which in turn undermines its authority, and respect for it. Senior management in the Haitian National Police itself and UNMIH members monitoring the force agree that, before they can reasonably be expected to manage things on their own, these young officers need the support that only the physical presence and guidance of experts and seasoned policemen can provide.

15. With respect to equipment, the United States, through ICITAP, has provided various items, including some vehicles, weapons and office furniture, while UNMIH, through the dedicated Trust Fund, has coordinated and supported the procurement of fire-fighting equipment, ambulances and other vehicles, as well as other equipment to enable the Haitian National Police to discharge its duties. Japan, the Republic of Korea and Luxembourg have contributed financially to the Trust Fund. The Haitian National Police, however, still needs considerably more resources to meet its basic equipment and infrastructural requirements, including the repair and construction of police stations. These needs are most urgent, and I again appeal to Member States to contribute generously to this worthwhile cause and enhance the capabilities of the Haitian National Police to meet the many challenges ahead.

V. JUDICIARY AND PRISON SYSTEMS

16. The situation with regard to the penitentiary system remains critical. The lack of infrastructure and equipment hampers the functioning of the inexperienced and overburdened National Penitentiary Administration. Earlier progress has been jeopardized by a sharp increase in the prison population, particularly in Port-au-Prince. With a monthly growth of 10 per cent by the end of 1995, the total number of inmates has reached 2,300 in the country's 18 prisons. The Ministry of Justice is coordinating efforts to prevent unnecessary arrests and to accelerate the processing of prisoner files by the judicial system. A joint National Penitentiary Administration-Haitian National Police working group will prepare plans to improve prison security.

17. In late December 1995, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the French Government signed a multilateral agreement with Haiti under which they will cofinance a US$ 2.9 million project for the rehabilitation of jails and the training of penitentiary personnel. A team of trainers has been set up and training is expected to start by mid-February 1996, as is the process of rehabilitating prisons.

18. The training of judicial personnel continued at the Justice Academy. Courses were organized for Justices of the Peace and Examining Judges in November-December 1995. Similar courses will be organized until all judicial

personnel have been covered. With respect to infrastructure, a programme of rehabilitation and construction of court houses has been prepared.

VI. DEVELOPMENT ACTIVITIES

19. In my last report, I mentioned that the improved conditions in the third quarter - e.g. lower inflation, stable foreign exchange, increasing public and private investments, lower unemployment - had come to a halt by mid-October, when Prime Minister Smarck Michel resigned, largely as a result of the uncertainty on economic policy, including privatization measures. While public investments have continued at a considerable pace in the fourth quarter, mainly financed by foreign aid, private investments have remained very sluggish and instances of the flight of capital have reappeared.

20. A team from the Bretton Woods institutions, the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) and the European Union held discussions with the Haitian authorities, led by the Prime Minister, in the last week of January 1996 in Port-au-Prince. Further negotiations on a new structural adjustment package will take place once the new Government has assumed power. Meanwhile, local and foreign businessmen are likely to remain cautious, and private investment will be subdued. Uncertainty regarding security conditions after the departure of UNMIH also contributes to this cautious approach.

21. The macroeconomic equilibrium, in particular the fiscal balance, has been seriously affected by the apparent change in policy since early October. As disbursements of structural adjustment-related loans were put on hold, a large financial gap emerged in the fiscal budget in the last quarter of 1995. This affected the balance of payments, and the exchange rate came under severe strain. Indeed, between mid-October and mid-November, the gourde depreciated by more than 20 per cent; it recovered after an intervention by the Central Bank, which sold more than US$ 20 million of reserves. Traditionally high foreign remittances by Haitian emigrants during the Christmas period have also helped to stabilize the gourde, at least temporarily.

22. The weakening of the gourde and the change in expectations in mid-October had a measurable impact on inflation, reversing a decline that had started in March. The rise in prices for food products, a large proportion of which is imported, was sharper than the rise in the cost-of-living index, increasing by 5.4 per cent in October-November 1995. This has strained the already limited budget of most Haitian households and, together with the substantial gap between aspirations and reality, partly explains the considerable increase in public demonstrations.

23. The budget proposal presented to the Chamber of Deputies includes current expenditure of approximately US$ 300 million, (about 6 per cent lower than the previous year) and a large development budget of around US$ 434 million. Total revenues for the fiscal year 1995/96 are projected at US$ 227 million (i.e. a monthly average of about US$ 19 million). Average monthly fiscal revenues from 1 October to 15 December 1995 amounted to approximately US$ 13 million, underlining the importance of new revenue-enhancing measures. Dependence on foreign assistance remained high, with around a quarter of current fiscal

expenditures funded by foreign resources, down from a third during the previous year. Virtually the entire public investment or "development" budget is expected to be financed by foreign non-concessional and aid funds.

24. The continuation of development cooperation efforts was critical in maintaining the pace of the Haitian economy. As stated in my previous report, total humanitarian and technical assistance and financial commitments by multilateral and bilateral donors and creditors for the period October 1994 to the year 2000 identified by end-August 1995 reached US$ 1.7 billion. Of these resources, about a third (including balance-of-payment support and debt forgiveness) were utilized between October 1994 and the end of 1995, but new commitments have been made since August 1995. Thus, external resources available for the next few years continue to be well above US$ 1 billion. This figure is still several times the annual gross domestic investment in infrastructure, machinery and equipment and attests to the critical need for an improved absorption capacity.

25. USAID was at the forefront of total disbursement since the return of President Aristide. Gradually, financing from IDB, the non-conditional resources of the World Bank and the European Union began to play a larger role. Bilateral donors like Canada, France and Germany continue to serve as an important source of concessional funding. Other donors, such as Japan, Spain and Switzerland, have also become more active in support of development programmes.

26. Sixteen Latin American and Caribbean countries under the sponsorship of the Latin American Economic System (SELA) and UNDP met in Port-au-Prince from 22 to 24 November 1995 to negotiate 144 development cooperation projects with the Haitian authorities. This unprecedented effort at horizontal cooperation led to agreement on 22 projects totally financed and 73 projects partially financed by Latin American and Caribbean countries. For the latter, tripartite agreements involving countries from the region, traditional multilateral and bilateral donors and the Government of Haiti will be sought. The financing of the remaining 49 projects is still under consideration.

27. Since my last report, the specialized agencies and programmes present in Haiti - UNDP, including the United Nations Capital Development Fund (UNCDF) and the United Nations Volunteers programme (UNV), the United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), the World Food Programme (WFP), the United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA), the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAO), the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and the World Health Organization (WHO) - have taken further steps to contribute to the implementation of the emergency economic recovery programme, while paying increasing attention to the developmental aspects of their activities. On 12 December 1995, under the leadership of the Resident Coordinator, these eight institutions, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank met to consider joint activities, emerging issues and priorities, their future programmes and interactions, and post-UNMIH activities. My Special Representative addressed that meeting and discussed current and future security and development-related issues with the representatives of these institutions.

During the meeting, the following elements were identified as critical in the Haitian context:

(a) The link between security and development. The former is critical for the latter, yet, without development, security cannot be assured;

(b) Poverty alleviation should be the focus of interventions by the United Nations system in Haiti;

(c) Sustainable development requires improved governance and protection and regeneration of the environment;

(d) Increased participation, in particular the advancement of women, is the key to making the most effective use of the country's human resources.

28. Increased absorption capacity, a critical aspect of improved governance, is a concern identified not only by United Nations programmes, specialized agencies and the Bretton Woods institutions, but also by bilateral and other multilateral donors. Indeed, several of them have programmes at the level of different ministries to improve management and increase absorption capacity. In order to harmonize such activities, including cooperation programmes with the Parliament, the Prime Minister and UNDP agreed on 22 December 1995 to a project to establish a unit in the Office of the Prime Minister to coordinate all existing programmes and new initiatives in this field.

29. The recent parliamentary and local elections have provided Haiti with renewed institutions: the Senate, the Chamber of Deputies, the mayors and the conseils d'administration des sections communales. At a time when members of Parliament are striving to assume their responsibilities, technical, secretarial and infrastructural facilities are clearly inadequate. UNDP, USAID and the Inter-Parliamentary Union are working with the Haitian authorities to strengthen the Parliament in order to enable it to play its role fully, and an agreement was signed between the Haitian authorities and UNDP on 17 November 1995 to that end. Meanwhile, UNDP financed and helped the Ministry of Interior to organize, from 18 to 20 October, a seminar for the newly elected mayors to assist them in their work. UNDP is discussing with national and local authorities additional support to the mayors and conseils d'administration des sections communales administrators to enable them to provide the population with the essential services they were elected to render.

VII. OPERATION OF UNMIH AND TRANSFER OF ITS RESPONSIBILITIES TO THE GOVERNMENT OF HAITI

Tasks undertaken by UNMIH

30. Since it took over responsibilities from the multinational force on 31 March 1995, UNMIH has assisted the Government of Haiti in sustaining a secure and stable environment and protecting international personnel and key installations. It established an environment conducive to the organization of free legislative, local and presidential elections and provided technical assistance for the entire electoral process. It has assisted with the creation

of the Haitian National Police, providing much-needed on-the-job training and guidance to the new Haitian policemen in the field. As the development of a cadre of competent supervisors both in the field and at the administrative level has lagged behind the training of basic-level policemen, CIVPOL has, since January 1996, focused on assistance in the organization of the managerial components of the offices of the departmental commissioners and the major commissariats of the Haitian National Police, and hopes to begin leadership training for those occupying junior and senior management positions in the Haitian National Police. In addition, a number of CIVPOL officers with expertise in areas such as finance, computers, personnel, logistics and communications are being identified and will be seconded to Haitian National Police Headquarters.

31. Since April 1995, UNMIH has provided security to humanitarian convoys, airports, seaports, storage locations and United Nations installations. With financial contributions from the Caisse française de développement and IDB, UNMIH engineering units have rebuilt the bridge in Jacmel that was washed away late in 1994. President Aristide participated in the opening of the new bridge on 15 December 1995. Contingents from Canada, the Netherlands and the United States have provided the stimulus for small development projects sponsored by their respective Governments, and other UNMIH contingents have also contributed to these activities. Overall, some 1,000 small projects, including training courses on disaster relief and prevention, were initiated by the Mission. As a result, conditions in rural communities have been improved, creating goodwill for UNMIH's contingents. The UNMIH Civil Affairs Unit is developing a plan for the completion of most of these projects prior to 15 February 1996. Responsibility for the completion of the remaining projects will be transferred to local communities or governmental and non-governmental agencies.

Drawdown of UNMIH

32. By its resolutions 940 (1994) of 31 July 1994 and 975 (1995) of 30 January 1995, the Security Council authorized the deployment in Haiti of up to 6,000 troops and 900 civilian police officers and requested me, inter alia, to ensure that the force level of UNMIH was suited to the tasks of the Mission and was kept under constant review.

33. Mindful of the need for economy, I started in October 1995 to reduce UNMIH's staff. By the end of January 1996, the number of civilian staff had decreased from 619 to 500 (170 international staff, 29 UNVs and 301 local staff members). All members of the Electoral Assistance Unit left Haiti during January 1996, following the presidential elections on 17 December 1995. By the end of February, only 155 international civilian staff, 29 UNVs and 237 local staff members will remain in UNMIH.

34. A phased reduction of CIVPOL personnel was conducted between October 1995 and January 1996, when 539 personnel from Argentina, Guinea-Bissau, the Philippines, Bangladesh, Jordan, Pakistan, Barbados, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia and Suriname left Haiti. At the end of February, a total of approximately 300 French-speaking personnel from Algeria, Benin, Canada, Djibouti, France, Mali, Togo and the Russian Federation will remain in Haiti.

35. On the military side, the concept developed for the reduction of the force level envisages the gradual vacating of outlying areas, starting with the least troublesome operational sectors and culminating in a reduced force in Port-au-Prince and Cap Haïtien. The primary base camps will be closed once the last contingents have departed from a particular sector.

36. The reduction of the force level was initiated with the repatriation of the Suriname contingent from Sector III (Jacmel) in mid-November 1995, the Indian military police company from Sector V (Port-au-Prince) at the end of that month, the Guatemalan military police company from Sector I (Cap Haïtien) in mid-December 1995, and the Honduran contingent from Sector II (Saint Marc) in mid-January 1996. The phased closure of the operational sectors where UNMIH military contingents have been deployed began in mid-January 1996 with the withdrawal of the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) contingent from Sector IV (Les Cayes and Jérémie). In February 1996, after the repatriation of the Netherlands and Nepalese contingents, Sectors II and III will be vacated. By 29 February, the troop level will be down to 4,100 combat personnel from Bangladesh, Canada, Djibouti, Pakistan and the United States, deployed in Port-au-Prince and Cap Haïtien.

Transfer of responsibilities to the Government of Haiti

37. UNMIH has paid special attention to the planning of a smooth and orderly transfer to the Government of Haiti of the responsibilities and functions that it has been carrying out on behalf of the Government. At the first meeting of the Trilateral Commission convened in Port-au-Prince on 16 November 1995, comprising the Government of Haiti, the United Nations and the Friends of the Secretary-General for Haiti (at the time Argentina, Canada, France, the United States and Venezuela), it was agreed that joint working groups would be formed to deal with all issues pertaining to transition. The working groups - on disarmament; information; justice, prisons and human rights; presidential security; election security; airports, seaports and coastguards; fire-fighting and urban disorders; and traffic - have subsequently met and reported to a follow-up committee. The Trilateral Commission met again at plenary level in Port-au-Prince on 19 January 1996 and is due to hold its third meeting on 16 February.

38. The assumption of presidential security responsibilities by the Presidential Security Unit, the National Presidential and Residence Guard and the Haitian National Police is under way and is progressing well. For the first time, security for a visit of President Aristide to Port-Salut and Les Cayes on 12 November 1995 was provided mainly by Haitian personnel. For the time being, UNMIH continues to maintain a small command and control presence at the National Palace to provide back-up security. A 156-man Haitian police riot control team is being trained with the support of France, which is also providing the necessary equipment, and ICITAP. This training will be completed by 23 February 1996.

39. The transition with regard to the overall responsibility at the Port-au-Prince international airport has already begun. The security of the airport itself is being provided by the Haitian National Police. UNMIH forces have started to hand over perimeter and gate security responsibilities to the

Haitian National Police, which will take full charge of these functions by 15 February 1996. Transfer of responsibility for the exterior security of the seaport will be completed by 21 February. The Government of Haiti, with Canadian and United States support, is in the process of setting up a new coastguard.

VIII. POSSIBLE FUTURE TASKS AND STRENGTH OF UNMIH

40. The courage and resilience of the people of Haiti, the resolve of President Aristide and the support of the international community ensured that Haiti's democratic experience did not end with the coup d'état of 1991. Since President Aristide's return in October 1994, Haiti has taken a number of steps to strengthen democracy. Local and legislative elections and the presidential election have taken place in an environment of calm and peace, and Haiti has witnessed the orderly and constitutional transfer of power from one democratically elected President to another. Parliament is applying itself to play its assigned role, and measures are being taken to improve the functioning of the judiciary. In keeping with its mandate, UNMIH has helped to maintain the secure and stable environment, without which these changes for the better would not have been possible.

41. While there is no indication of an organized threat to the Government of Haiti at this time, concern has been expressed in many quarters that growing popular discontent could be used by disgruntled groups to foment trouble once President Aristide has handed over power and UNMIH leaves the country.

42. Widespread unemployment and underemployment, inadequate or non-existing services and infrastructure and other economic hardships are weighing on the people of Haiti who, as can be seen from the growing number of demonstrations, are getting restive. The Government of President Préval will have to take a number of difficult decisions to energize economic development and attract domestic and foreign investment. But, for his efforts to succeed, the security climate needs to be judged satisfactory and stable by prospective investors - be they nationals, Haitian expatriates or foreigners.

43. The large amount of financial and technical assistance that is available to Haiti gives the new Government an opportunity to foster economic and social progress. The holding of the presidential elections in December 1995 restored some confidence in the country's stability. However, the direction of social and economic policies will remain the key determinant of private investment and improved living conditions. In the current context, policy decisions in the first months of the new Government and improved administrative management will be critical for private resource mobilization, as well as for the ability to put available foreign aid to meaningful use.

44. The end of the present mandate of UNMIH comes just three weeks after the inauguration of the newly elected President of the Republic. By the time UNMIH is due to cease all its operations - 29 February 1996, at midnight - Mr. René Préval will scarcely have had time to form his cabinet and secure parliamentary ratification for it. The new Ministers will be just beginning to

familiarize themselves with their responsibilities and will be handicapped by an inadequately trained, inexperienced and ill-equipped civil service.

45. As for the Haitian National Police, it must be remembered that just over a year ago, the creation of a national police was a project that was still struggling to get off the ground. In March 1995, the Police Academy began training its first class of cadets, who graduated and were deployed in June. The new police was received with open arms by the population, and its performance in the streets of Cap Haïtien and Port-au-Prince during the first weeks of deployment was full of promise. At last, Haiti could look forward to a force that was there to protect, not persecute; to help others rather than help themselves; to serve the public and not be served. They are still looked on favourably in most places by their fellow citizens but their image has been deteriorating. But the last class of the Haitian National Police, due to graduate around mid-February 1996, will have had no more than a few days of actual field experience by the time UNMIH is scheduled to leave. Furthermore, the scarcity of equipment - vehicles, communications, even handcuffs and batons, accommodation which is often very poor, and the near-total absence of experienced leadership are responsible for a lack of self-confidence among these quickly trained and mostly very young policemen. This has led to cases of indiscipline, disproportionate use of force and abuse of power, which are starting to raise questions in many people's minds.

46. For all these reasons, observers are nearly unanimous in saying that this young police force needs support for a while longer and that UNMIH should not, therefore, cease its activities abruptly on 29 February 1996 but should continue to assist the Government for a few more months, while its assets are gradually withdrawn. The Trilateral Commission meetings, which started on 16 November 1995, have reached the same conclusion and strongly recommend that the drawdown plan of UNMIH should be shaped in a manner that takes these considerations into account.

47. In these circumstances, I welcome the request, contained in President Préval's letter to me of 9 February 1996, that UNMIH's mandate should be extended and its withdrawal carried out gradually over a period of months. I believe it essential that, while the Haitian National Police is completing preparation for the full assumption of its duties, UNMIH should continue to provide support to the Government of Haiti in its efforts to exercise its responsibility for the maintenance of law and order in a very difficult environment. I therefore recommend an extension of the mandate of UNMIH for a period of six months starting 1 March 1996. I further recommend, in the light of the gradual transfer of some of its earlier functions to the Haitian authorities, that the strength of both its military and its CIVPOL components be reduced on the lines described in paragraphs 51 to 54 below.

Mandate of UNMIH after 29 February 1996

48. With the building up of the Haitian security forces and the gradual transfer of responsibilities to those forces, the level of assistance required will continue to decrease. For instance, specialized units, such as the Presidential Security Unit, the National Presidential and Residence Guard, the Ministerial Guard and the Court Security Unit, will require only minimal

assistance. It will soon be necessary to provide security for the former President, but the additional assistance needed by the Haitian authorities to meet this demand will also be minimal. Port and airport security is being handed over to Haitian security forces. Operations such as city patrolling or escorting humanitarian convoys are being gradually transferred to the Haitian National Police, so that UNMIH forces will serve mainly as a back-up to the Haitian National Police and CIVPOL. Elections for territorial assemblies may be held during the next six months, in which case UNMIH could assist in maintaining an environment conducive to their free and fair conduct. With respect to the professionalization of the security forces, it will be recalled that FAd'H has been dismantled; UNMIH will continue to focus on training the new civilian Haitian National Police.

49. In other words, the tasks to be undertaken under an extended mandate would be consonant with the purposes of those originally entrusted to UNMIH by the Security Council in its resolutions 867 (1993), 940 (1994) and 1007 (1995). But it must be clear that the efforts devoted to their implementation would have to take into account the reduced strength of the military and CIVPOL components of UNMIH, as well as improved conditions in Haiti and the new Government's objectives. Primary responsibility for the maintenance of a stable and secure environment rests with the Haitian Government. In assisting the Government of Haiti in this regard, UNMIH would continue to operate with the full consent of the legitimate authorities of the country and in close cooperation with them. Many of the units that it is envisaged would comprise the downsized UNMIH are already in Haiti and most of the CIVPOL personnel who would remain in UNMIH are experienced and familiar with the country, its people and culture. This would permit continuity in operations. Rules of engagement would remain as described in paragraphs 64 and 65 of my report of 17 January 1995 (S/1995/46).

50. In accordance with the usual practice, preliminary consultations have been conducted with Member States to secure contributions of the necessary military and CIVPOL personnel, should the Security Council decide to extend the mandate. It is envisaged that, subject to confirmation of the agreement of the Governments concerned, the military component of UNMIH would be composed of contingents from Argentina, Bangladesh, Canada and Pakistan. Algeria, Benin, Canada, Djibouti, France, Mali, Togo, the Netherlands and the Russian Federation have indicated that they would be prepared to contribute to the CIVPOL component of the Mission.

51. In order to achieve the Mission's objectives as described above, 1,600 infantry personnel, 300 combat support personnel, 300 CIVPOL, 160 international civilian staff, 18 UNVs and 150 local staff would be required.

52. The military component would consist of three infantry battalions, including two incoming reconnaissance companies and a Quick Reaction Force, based on infantry and helicopter assets that would be stationed in Port-au-Prince. The combat support elements would include an engineer company, a transport platoon, an aviation squadron, a field hospital, a military police platoon and headquarters personnel.

53. Two operational zones would be drawn up with their respective centres of gravity in Port-au-Prince and Cap Haïtien (see map). One battalion would remain

in zone II in the North and two battalions would assume responsibilities in operational zone I (Centre/South). The Quick Reaction Force would need the capability to deploy by vehicle or by helicopter, with a minimum capacity to carry one platoon and one vehicle, to respond rapidly to occurrences on the ground in areas outside Port-au-Prince and Cap Haïtien where the military presence of UNMIH would be maintained only by periodic patrols conducted by two reconnaissance companies. In conducting operations throughout Haiti, the reduced UNMIH would need to maintain sufficient air assets in the form of light and medium-lift helicopters. This capability would be even more important in view of the CIVPOL component's deployment throughout Haiti.

54. In order to make an orderly transition to a smaller military component of UNMIH, the following plan has been developed:

(a) The United States would end its peace-keeping commitment to UNMIH as of 29 February 1996. However, the United States Government has agreed to leave 320 support personnel for the closure of the base camps and to provide the Mission with helicopter assets and medical units until their replacement by similar incoming units, on condition that this replacement takes place no later than 15 April 1996. All other United States forces will leave Haiti by 15 March 1996;

(b) The rotation of the contingent from Pakistan, due in mid-March, will reduce its present strength of 850 personnel to 525. As of 15 March 1996, after the departure from Haiti of the 1,400 United States and 325 soldiers from Pakistan, the strength of UNMIH's military component would be 2,700 personnel;

(c) No later than mid-April, with the repatriation of the United States support personnel, the departure of the Djibouti contingent soon after, the reduction of the Bangladesh contingent from 850 to 525 personnel and the arrival of new units, the strength of the military component would be 1,600 infantry and 300 combat support personnel.

IX. FINANCIAL ASPECTS

55. The General Assembly, by its resolution 50/90 of 19 December 1995, authorized me to enter into commitments in connection with the maintenance of UNMIH at a rate not to exceed US$ 10 million (gross) per month for the period from 1 March to 31 May 1996. This authorization is subject to a decision of the Security Council to extend the mandate of the Mission.

56. The preliminary cost estimate for the continuation of UNMIH, at the reduced strength recommended above and for a six-month period until 31 August 1996, would amount to US$ 56.1 million. Should the Security Council decide to extend the mandate of UNMIH, I would then seek the additional resources required from the General Assembly at its resumed fiftieth session. A breakdown of the estimated cost by main categories of expenditure is provided for information purposes in annex I to the present report.

57. As at 22 January 1996, unpaid assessed contributions to the UNMIH special account since the inception of the Mission amounted to $60 million. The total of outstanding assessed contributions for all peace-keeping operations on 22 January 1996 was US$ 1,680.3 million.

X. OBSERVATIONS

58. The work of UNMIH and of the multinational force that preceded it has provided Haiti with an opportunity to build up the public security service, the judiciary and the civil service and create the other conditions needed for economic and social development to advance and for democracy to take firm hold. But as the present report makes clear, much remains to be done before it can be said that democratic rule is secure in Haiti and its people have embarked irreversibly on the road to peace, tolerance and prosperity. This, basically, is why I recommend in the present report that the Security Council should give a positive response to President Préval's request and I therefore propose that the Security Council extend the mandate of UNMIH for a further period of six months.

59. I have also recommended that the Mission should be substantially reduced from its present strength. This is partly due to the fact that some of the present functions of UNMIH have been transferred to the new institutions which, with its help, are being established in Haiti. But a reduction in the size of the Mission is also necessitated by the financial crisis in which the United Nations now finds itself. I shall be alert to further opportunities to economize during the proposed extension of the mandate so that UNMIH can complete its tasks at the lowest possible cost to the Member States.

60. The people of Haiti have started on the long road towards a democratic and peaceful society where the benefits of development can be enjoyed by all Haitians. But they and their leaders know well that although they can be proud of what has been done in the short period since the return of constitutional government, they still face formidable challenges. They also know that, important and useful as international assistance may be, it is ultimately the Haitians themselves, and they alone, who are in charge of their present and responsible for their future.

61. It is essential that the continued commitment I am asking the international community to make to Haiti at a time of acute financial crisis in the United Nations be matched with a renewed commitment by the Haitian people, by their political and civic leaders and by their Government. This opportunity is unique in Haiti's long and often turbulent history. It could not be missed without grave consequences. The people of Haiti must mobilize their energies, put aside their differences and work together to rebuild their country in a way that brings benefit for all.

62. I would like to pay tribute to President Aristide for his leadership and sagacity in steering Haiti on the road to democracy and to thank him and his Government for the cooperation extended to UNMIH. I wish President René Préval well and assure him of the continued support of the United Nations and its agencies and programmes. I call upon the international community as a whole to renew its commitment to support Haiti, its people and its new President.

63. I thank the international community and those organizations, programmes and agencies that have assisted the electoral authorities of Haiti in their work throughout 1995, particularly OAS, whose Electoral Observation Mission monitored and verified the elections.

64. I would also like to commend the troops, civilian police officers and international civilian personnel who performed their duties under challenging circumstances and made an important contribution to the difficult task of promoting the restoration of democracy in Haiti. Throughout this period, the Force Commander Major-General Joseph W. Kinzer and Chief Superintendent Neil Pouliot have provided distinguished leadership to their personnel.

65. In concluding the report, I wish to commend my Special Representative, Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi, for his outstanding leadership, which ensured the remarkable achievements of UNMIH.

Annex I

Estimated cost of UNMIH for the period from 1 March to 31 August 1996

(In thousands of United States dollars)

Military personnel	21 670
Civilian personnel	15 700
Premises/accommodation	1 680
Infrastructure repairs	150
Transport operations	2 100
Air operations	2 060
Naval operations	70
Communications	530
Other equipment	470
Supplies and services	7 770
Election-related supplies and services	0
Public information programmes	120
Training programmes	0
Mine-clearing programmes	0
Assistance for disarmament and demobilization	0
Air and surface freight	1 590
Integrated Management Information System	0
Support account for peace-keeping operations	800
Staff assessment	1 390
Total	56 100

Annex II

Composition and strength of the military component of UNMIH as of 1 February 1996

Nationality	Operational military forces	Support military forces	Force headquarters	Total
Bahamas			1	1
Bangladesh	Infantry 847		15	862
Canada		Aviation Engineer 447 Transport	23	470
Djibouti	Infantry 198		2	200
France			1	1
Guyana			1	1
Honduras			2	2
India			1	1
Ireland			2	2
Jamaica			1	1
Nepal	Infantry 409		2	411
Netherlands	Infantry 151		2	153
Pakistan	Infantry 844		12	856
Trinidad and Tobago			1	1
United States of America	Infantry, Military Police, Special Operations Forces 1 271	Aviation Engineer 534 Medical	48	1 853
Total	3 720	981	114	4 815

Annex III

Composition and strength of the civilian police component of UNMIH as of 1 February 1996

Algeria	15
Benin	34
Canada	92
Djibouti	14
France	92
Mali	24
Nepal	53
Russian Federation	5
Togo	20
Total	349



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